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1. Introduction 
 In an earlier article in this journal,
1
 I began an inquiry into the role of 
cinema as an instrument of propaganda. The questions that frame this research 
program are easy to raise, but not necessarily easy to answer. They include: 
What is propaganda? Is it inherently immoral or at least morally suspect, and 
if so, why? What use has historically been made of film for propaganda? If 
film is effective as a propaganda vehicle, by what psychological mechanisms 
does it work? Is film the medium best suited for propaganda, and if so, why? I 
suggested in that article that a good place to start this research program is with 
the Nazi film industry, but I omitted an explanation of why. Let me correct 
that mistake here. It seems to me that there are several reasons why the Nazi 
film industry is a natural starting point. 
 First, the Nazis explicitly praised the power of film as a tool for 
propagandizing. In this, they unabashedly emulated the Bolsheviks, a group 
they otherwise despised—indeed, regarded as their mortal enemies. This 
allows us to understand how they thought they could use the medium as part 
of their propaganda campaign. Second, the Nazis (like the Bolsheviks) early 
on in their reign of power took control of—and then completely 
nationalized—the country’s film industry. This insured that only movies that 
promoted the regime’s agenda were produced, so we can see precisely how 
they tailored their films to promote that agenda. Third, the Nazis used every 
medium of communication to propagandize; by looking at the role film played 
in contrast with other propaganda media they employed, we can get a sense of 
the relative usefulness of film in their propaganda campaign.    
 In this article, I focus on the question of how the Nazis tailored their 
propaganda movies to the regime’s agenda. In order to do this, it is important 
to make a distinction. In business, the word “marketing” is ambiguous. It can 
refer to advertising, which typically aims at making your target audience 
generally aware of your brand (that is, your whole product line). It can also 
refer to (direct) sales, which aims at getting specific people to buy specific 
                                                          
1 Gary James Jason, “Film and Propaganda: The Lessons of the Nazi Film Industry,” 
Reason Papers 35, no. 1 (July 2013), pp. 203-19. 
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products from your brand’s product line. The Nazis did both by using cinema 
to promote their general “brand” and their specific policies and actions. 
 As an example of advertising, consider Leni Riefenstahl’s famous (or 
notorious) 1935 documentary, Triumph of the Will.
2
 That film clearly was 
designed to promote Hitler and the Nazi Party generally to the German 
people. (As I have commented at length on the film elsewhere,
3
 I will touch 
on it briefly here.)  
 Triumph of the Will is a documentary, and labeled as such, of the 
huge 1934 Nazi rally in Nuremberg. That event was a major propaganda 
opportunity, since Hitler had been appointed Germany’s Chancellor just the 
year before and he was still not well known among much of the public. The 
film was powerfully effective in achieving its goals. It opens with footage of 
Hitler in his plane, which (in Messiah-like symbolism) descends from the 
heavens through the clouds and over masses of his worshippers in formation 
below. In another scene, we see a large Hitler Youth camp, with handsome, 
wholesome young men washing and shaving, and then having fun gathering 
wood as the cooks prepare a common breakfast. In yet another scene, we see 
members of the German Labor Front identify where they are from, each 
naming a different region in Germany.  
 What purpose did these scenes serve in promoting the Nazi Party? 
The first served to convey the larger-than-life quality of the Fuhrer. The 
second equates the Nazi brand with wholesome youthfulness, not the 
“depravity” that supposedly characterized the Weimar Republic which Hitler 
just swept away. The third stresses the theme of the Party as the workers’ 
protector— “Nazi” comes from the abbreviation for its full name, the National 
Socialist German Workers Party—as well as a force for national unity.  
  It was the sales aspect of Nazi film upon which I focused in my 
earlier article for this journal.
4
 In that piece, I reviewed in detail a classic 
German documentary on Nazi cinema—Germany Awake!—directed by Erwin 
Leiser.
5
 The Nazis took control of the highly advanced German film industry 
when Hitler was named Chancellor in 1933, took control of film criticism and 
banned foreign films in 1936, and finally completely nationalized the industry 
in 1937. The film industry was, for the duration of the war, used to promote 
the Nazi Party and its policies (as well as to provide general entertainment).  
                                                          
2 Triumph of the Will, directed by Leni Riefenstahl (Reichsparteitag-Film, 1935).  
 
3 Gary James Jason, “Ein Volk, Ein Fuhrer,” Liberty (April 2007), pp. 48-51, accessed 
online at: 
http://www.libertyunbound.com/sites/files/printarchive/Liberty_Magazine_April_2007
.pdf.  
 
4 Jason, “Film and Propaganda.”  
 
5 Germany Awake! directed by Erwin Leiser (Erwin Leiser Film Productions, 1968).  
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 Leiser’s film does an outstanding job of showing which Nazi films 
were aimed at selling which policies. In order to pull worker support away 
from the German Communist Party (its main rival in its early days), the Nazis 
produced Hans Westmar (1933) and Hitler Youth Quex (1933). They push the 
Nazi party line regarding the Soviets (which shifted because the two regimes 
first entered into a non-aggression pact, but then the Nazi regime violated it), 
by producing Frisians in Peril (1935) and Bismarck (1940). So as to demean 
democracy and portray it as weak, they produced My Son, the Minister (1937). 
In order to promote their historical narrative (which I call the Nazi Historical 
Narrative
6
), the Nazis produced For Merit (1938), D III 88 (1938), Venus on 
Trial (1941), and Homecoming (1941). They promoted with several films their 
view of pan-Germanism, or “Aryanism”—that is, the idea that citizens of 
another country who are of German ancestry (“blood”) are members of a 
Greater Germany. The Nazis produced Request-Concert (1940), Victory in the 
West (1941), Stukas (1941), and Kolberg (1945) so as to persuade Germans to 
support the larger war, and produced Carl Peters (1941) and Uncle Kruger 
(1941) to persuade them to support war specifically against Britain. In order to 
promote the view of Hitler as a military genius, they produced The Great King 
(1942). In order to persuade Germans of their virulent anti-Semitism policy, 
the Nazis produced Robert and Bertram (1939), Linen from Ireland (1939), 
The Eternal Jew (1940), The Rothschilds (1940), and Jew Suss (1940).
7
 
 In this article I will focus on how the Nazis employed cinematic 
propaganda—in Robert and Bertram and Linen from Ireland—to make the 
German people support, or at least not oppose, the genocide of the Jews. (In a 
                                                          
6 The Nazi Historical Narrative is an outgrowth of the stab-in-the-back theory that the 
Germans lost World War I because liberal democratic and communist traitors in the 
German government sold out the military. 
 
7 Hans Westmar, directed by Franz Wenzler (Siegel-Monopolfilm,1933); Hitler Youth 
Quex, directed by Hans Steinhoff (Universum Film AG, 1933); Frisians in Peril, 
directed by Willi Krause (National Socialist State Propaganda Directorate, 1935); 
Bismarck, directed by Wolfgang Liebeneiner (Tobis Filmkunst, 1940); My Son, the 
Minister, directed by Veit Harlan (Universum Film, 1937); For Merit, directed by Karl 
Ritter (Universum Film, 1938); D III 88, directed by Herbert Maisch (Tobis Filmkunst, 
1938); Venus on Trial, directed by Hans Zerlett (Bavaria-Filmkunst, 1941); 
Homecoming, directed by Gustav Ucicky (Wien-Film, 1941); Request-Concert, 
directed by Eduard von Borsody (Universum Film-Verleih, 1940); Victory in the West, 
directed by Karl Ritter (Universum Film, 1941); Stukas, directed by Karl Ritter 
(Universum Film, 1941); Kolberg, directed by Veit Harlan (Universum Film, 1945); 
Carl Peters, directed by Herbert Selpin (Bavaria-Filmkunst, 1941); Uncle Kruger, 
directed by Hans Steinhoff (Tobis FilmKunst, 1941); The Great King, directed by Veit 
Harlan (Tobis Filmkunst, 1942); Robert and Bertram, directed by Hans Zerlett (Tobis 
Filmkunst, 1939); Linen from Ireland, directed by Heinz Helbig (Bavaria-Filmkunst, 
1939); The Eternal Jew, directed by Fritz Hippler (Deutsche Filmherstellungs, 1940); 
The Rothschilds, directed by Erich Waschneck (Universum Film, 1940); and Jew Suss, 
directed by Veit Harlan (Terra-Filmkunst, 1940). 
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subsequent article in this journal, I will focus on The Eternal Jew, The 
Rothschilds, and Jew Suss.) While much contention surrounds the issue of 
whether the German people generally knew that the “Final Solution of the 
Jewish Problem” entailed the mass murder of Jews in concentration camps 
(which I discuss in more detail below), the general German public did not in 
any way visibly oppose the Jews being shipped away en masse. Historically, 
anti-Semitism was (and clearly continues to be) endemic in German culture, 
as it was (and is) in all European countries—and in America as well.8 Yet the 
level of out-group hatred the Germans felt toward the Jews had to be 
amplified by Nazi propaganda so as to facilitate their extermination campaign. 
German cinema—and other media—were called upon to sell, if not genocide 
as such, at least genocidal hatred. Before turning to our two films (in Sections 
4 and 5), I will first explain in Section 2 what genocidal hatred is and why it 
typically has to be cultivated. Section 3 will be devoted to a brief articulation 
of the psychological mechanisms involved in marketing. These will provide 
us with useful tools for analyzing how the Nazis used film for propaganda 
purposes. 
 
2. Genocide and Absolute War 
 It is worth noting here that genocide is in fact rather common in 
human history, especially during the twentieth century. This case has been 
made forcefully in a recent book by Abram de Swann.
9
 He calculates that 
since the late-nineteenth century, while the total killed in “regular wars” (by 
which he means “direct combat”) is about 25 million, the total killed in 
genocides is 100 million. These genocides range from the killing of one 
million Congolese villagers by Belgian troops around 1900 to Stalin’s Great 
Terror in the 1930s (killing perhaps 20 million) to the Holocaust (killing about 
11 million) to the killing of one million Hindus in Bangladesh by Pakistan’s 
army—and the list continues. 
 De Swann emphasizes the role of propaganda in conditioning 
citizens of a genocidal regime to overcome their innate sympathies for others 
so that they participate in (or at least not oppose) mass killing of a group 
targeted by the regime. He makes this point when characterizing 
“genocidaires” (his term for those who participate in mass killings):  
 
The genocidaires are overwhelmingly young and healthy men, and 
the great majority of them have a background in the military, the 
                                                          
8 In fact, it seems likely that anti-Semitism is growing again in Europe; for a defense of 
this claim, see Gary James Jason, “Disquieting Developments,” Liberty (April 22, 
2015), accessed online at: http://libertyunbound.com/node/1404. 
 
9 Abram de Swann, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).  For a review of de Swann’s book, see Gary 
James Jason, “Are We All Little Eichmann’s?” Philosophia (forthcoming).  
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police, and the regime’s militias. Most of them by far sympathize 
with the regime, having joined the party or its auxiliary movements. 
They have been steeped in the official propaganda and learned to 
identify with their peers and disidentify from the target group, often 
with corresponding feelings of loyalty and loathing.
10
  
 
 However, de Swann says almost nothing about what form this 
propaganda takes. Moreover, by his own concession, he includes in the term 
“genocide” mass killings that don’t fit the standard definition of the term, such 
as mass killings of people of a certain economic class; the mass killing of 
opponents of a regime; or the mass killing, rape, and plunder of civilians by 
soldiers who have conquered a territory. It is not likely that the type of 
propaganda that would be used to support the killing of an ethnic group would 
be the same as, say, that used to justify killing regime opponents. 
 In order to understand genocide more precisely and how it typically 
needs to be sold, let’s turn to a classic piece of sociology written at the outset 
of World War II by Hans Speier.
11
 Speier offers an insightful analysis of war 
not through a discussion of its political causes, but by how the enemy is 
perceived or “socially defined.” 
 Suppose that one tribe/community/nation (the “in-group”) attacks 
another tribe (the enemy or “out-group”). In what ways can the in-group view 
or define the out-group? Speier characterizes three basic ways, which inform 
three different types of war, differing markedly in ferocity: “instrumental 
war,” “agonistic war,” and “absolute war.”12 
 For the in-group, the purpose of instrumental war is to defeat the out-
group and take or control its assets. That is, the in-group wants the territory, 
markets, or natural resources of the out-group. This may include viewing the 
out-group population itself as an additional resource, in which case the in-
group might want to enslave the out-group’s population. While instrumental 
war can be quite fierce, the warfare is usually constrained because the out-
group is not viewed as inherently evil or loathsome. Moreover, the out-group 
is often seen to be of economic use (as an export market, say, or source of 
labor).  
 In agonistic war, the in-group views the out-group as being the same 
sort of people as it is, and even share its values, but wants to fight the out-
group for glory or justice. Speier gives the example of wars between ancient 
Greek city-states, and I might suggest that jousting knights and (later) dueling 
                                                          
10 De Swann, The Killing Compartments, p. 215. 
 
11 Hans Speier, “The Social Types of War,” American Journal of Sociology 46, no. 4 
(January 1941), pp. 445-54. 
 
12 Ibid., p. 453. Speier concedes that these are abstractions, in that most actual wars 
often have characteristics of more than one pure form and can mutate from one form to 
another as events progress. 
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cavaliers are similar. In agonistic war, Speier adds, the fighting often has a 
kind of ritual function, rather like a religious (“morality”) play. 
 Both instrumental and agonistic wars are often, if not usually, 
“regulated” wars, meaning they are constrained by shared rules of warfare. 
These are rules about where battle can take place, what times it can occur, 
what forms of conduct have to be observed (for example, regarding the 
treatment of prisoners), what weapons can be used, on what people the 
weapons can be used (for example, combatants), and what can be done to the 
opponent’s territory. 
 In absolute war, by contrast, the out-group is viewed as inherently 
evil, essentially different from the in-group, and intrinsically threatening to the 
very existence (or at least the internal cohesion) of the in-group. The out-
group is viewed as being essentially different either in appearance, religion, 
culture, or race in a way that is at the same time disgusting and threatening, 
hence intolerable to the in-group. Reverting to the example of the ancient 
Greeks, Speier points out that while the wars between Greek city-states were 
agonistic, the wars the Greeks fought against tribes they characterized as 
“barbarian” were absolute.13 He also includes as modern examples of absolute 
war the following: ideological wars, “fought in the name of political beliefs so 
dear to the belligerents that they arouse a crusading spirit”14; civil wars, where 
one side regards the other as treasonous in betraying the tribe itself and thus 
deserving of annihilation; religious wars; and colonial wars. 
As a consequence of the way the in-group perceives the out-group, 
the goal of absolute war is to exterminate the out-group. As Speier so 
trenchantly puts it, “Peace terminating an absolute war is established without 
the enemy. The opponent is an existential enemy. Absolute war is waged in 
order to annihilate him.”15 As a result, there are no rules in absolute war—no 
limitations on the weapons used, the degree of suffering inflicted, the amount 
of treachery utilized, or quantity of terror employed. Worse yet, there are no 
distinctions about which members of the out-group can be killed; they are all 
to be killed in this sort of war.  
 Speier wrote his piece in 1941, so he didn’t use the term “genocide,” 
which was a neologism coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 to describe the 
Nazi’s systematic extermination of whole groups, most systematically the 
Jews.
16
 He defined it in part as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming 
at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with 
                                                          
13 Ibid., p. 446. 
 
14 Ibid., p. 447. 
 
15 Ibid., p. 445. 
 
16 “What Is Genocide?” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed online 
at: https://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/defining-genocide.  
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the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”17 Clearly, the aim of absolute 
war is the genocide of the out-group. 
 The term “genocide” was used as a descriptive term at the 1945 
Nuremberg War-Crime trials. In 1948 the United Nations (U.N.) approved the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
which in effect made genocide an international crime, a crime against 
humanity. The U.N. characterizes genocide as  
 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) 
Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group.
18
  
 
I would add here as an analytical point that exactly how the in-group 
tribe decides to commit genocide against the out-group tribe depends in great 
part on the in-group tribe’s view of metaphysics. For example, if the in-group 
tribe views tribal membership as conferred by conversion to its religious faith, 
this suggests the genocidal strategy of killing all those out-group adults who 
refuse to convert and then turning their children over to be raised by in-group 
parents. If the in-group has a patrilineal view of tribal membership, it suggests 
a different genocidal strategy: kill all of the out-group adult males and turn the 
out-group women over to in-group males to marry. (Here, social acceptance of 
polygamy assists the implementation of the strategy.) The in-group tribe 
might also kill the out-group tribe’s male children, and then raise the out-
group female children until they can be married off to in-group males. (Here, 
social acceptance of child marriage assists the implementation of the strategy.) 
Note, however, that if the in-group tribe holds that all out-group members—
including people of mixed in-group/out-group lineage—are inherently evil (or 
racially inferior, or inherently diseased in some way), it suggests the genocidal 
strategy of wholesale extermination. This might be done by killing the out-
group children (and elderly) outright and then working the out-group adults to 
death. Indeed, it was this latter approach that the Nazi regime pursued. 
 Returning to Speier’s tripartite categorization of war, one could say 
that Nazi Germany in fact pursued all three types of war. Toward France in 
particular, it pursued an agonistic war. Hitler clearly felt that the victory of the 
French (and the other allies) in World War I was a humiliation for his country, 
so when France capitulated early in World War II, he insisted that the 
                                                          
17 Ibid. 
 
18 Ibid. 
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surrender document be signed in the same railway car in which the Treaty of 
Versailles had been signed. The Nazi occupation of France during the 
remainder of the war was comparatively benign—at least until substantial 
resistance developed. 
 The Nazi war against Eastern Europe and Russia was an instrumental 
war, or at least started as such. Hitler was clear about his intentions regarding 
this area early in shaping his regime. The Ukraine was the breadbasket of 
Europe, Russia and Romania had immense reserves of oil, and Germany 
required “living space” for its growing population which those lands (or at 
least the western parts thereof) would furnish. The inhabitants—primarily 
Slavic peoples—would serve as pools of (essentially slave) labor as well as 
markets for Germany’s factories. This war, especially when Hitler made the 
decision to attack Russia, was ferocious, with high casualties on both sides as 
battlegrounds included major cities. Initially, captured soldiers on both sides 
were put in concentration camps for the duration, but as the war became more 
ferocious, the POWs of each side were increasingly abused and killed by the 
other side. The Nazis killed upward of two million Soviet POWs, while 
various sources estimate that between 380,000 and 1.1 million German POWs 
died in Soviet prison camps.
19
 
 The domestic war against the Jews was absolute. The Jews in 
occupied Europe were sent to concentration camps precisely to die—either 
worked to death or killed outright. On the Eastern front, the SS 
Einsatzgruppen widely massacred Jews wherever they found them—including 
whole villages, such as Babi Yar, where nearly 34,000 Jews were shot in two 
days. 
 In order to support an absolute war, especially one that is aimed at 
genocide, the work of the in-group propagandist is difficult. He probably 
would have to make the out-group appear both vile and threatening, and so 
much so that the members of the out-group should be eradicated. That would 
involve arousing the in-group members’ emotions of disgust and fear to such a 
degree that they overcome the innate feeling of sympathy for the vulnerable, 
especially children. “Selling” genocide requires the in-group propagandist to 
engage in deep and sustained emotional manipulation of the in-group’s 
members. That would be necessary for moving people to commit the nearly 
indescribable horrors that were perpetrated against the Jews and most of the 
concentration camp prisoners. One must look at footage of the terrible deeds 
inflicted upon the prisoners—the beatings, the rapes, the grotesque medical 
“experiments,” the acts of obscene humiliation, and the tortures—to 
understand the level of hatred at work.
20
 
                                                          
19 “German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union,” s.v. Wikipedia, accessed online at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_prisoners_of_war_in_the_Soviet_Union.  
  
20 A number of Holocaust documentaries are currently available online and through 
catalogs. These documentaries are ghastly viewing. If the reader has not seen any of 
these films, I would recommend that he start with Director George Steven’s 
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 De Swann’s perspective helps us understand how the Nazis were able 
to carry out the Holocaust, and it ties in with Speier’s view of total war. The 
selling of anti-Semitism—a major part of the Nazis’ ideological 
underpinnings—was crucial to their regime. Upon defining the Jews as the 
“disgusting” out-group who threatened the “purity” and existence of the in-
group (the “Aryans”), they called for absolute war. Since much of the 
regime’s domestic agenda was focused on the “Jewish problem” from the day 
it achieved power, their agenda necessitated some sort of justification for 
massive changes to German law and culture. 
 I disagree with Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, who views the Nazis’ anti-
Semitic propaganda as having been targeted at only a segment of the public: 
“It was an audience which constituted a particular market, namely those 
citizens of the Third Reich who had a particular appetite for incendiary anti-
Semitic imagery.”21 This is historically false, as I believe a number of facts 
show. 
 First, Adolf Hitler never hid his anti-Semitism; it was manifest from 
the beginning. His 1925 book Mein Kampf
22
 presented his worldview and was 
widely available to the German public. After 1933 it was commonly given to 
German couples as a wedding gift. It bristles with anti-Semitic statements, 
such as “There were few Jews in Linz. In the course of the centuries their 
outward appearance had become Europeanized and had taken on a human 
look; in fact, I even took them for Germans.”23 Even prior to taking control of 
the government, the Nazi Party made its antipathy toward Jews unmistakably 
clear by forbidding Jews from attending Nazi rallies from the outset. 
Furthermore, the Party’s organized mob staged constant attacks on Jews, 
vandalizing synagogues and organizing local boycotts against Jewish 
businesses. 
 Second, consider the timeline of the regime after it took power.
24
 
Anti-Semitism was central to the regime—not just in theory, but in practice. 
This must have been obvious to the average German citizen. In January 1933, 
                                                                                                                              
documentary Nazi Concentration Camps (1945). It is a concise yet comprehensive 
account made specifically to acquaint Americans with what actually occurred, since 
previous reports had been met with skepticism. 
 
21 Nicholas O’Shaughnessy, “Selling Hitler: Propaganda and the Nazi Brand,” Journal 
of Public Affairs 9 (2009), pp. 55-76. 
 
22 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1999). 
 
23 Ibid., p. 52. Hitler expresses his anti-Semitism in numerous other places throughout 
the book; see, e.g., pp. 50-65, 119-21, 300-316, 319-20, 622-24, and 637-40. 
 
24 For a full timeline of the Holocaust, see “Holocaust Timeline,” accessed online at: 
http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/timeline.html.     
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Hitler was named Chancellor of Germany. At this time, Germany had a 
population of 67 million, but a Jewish population of only about 500,000.
25
 In 
March 1933, the Nazis opened Dachau concentration camp near Munich, 
quickly followed by Buchenwald near Weimar (Germany’s cultural center) 
and Sachsenhausen near Berlin. In other words, the first concentration camps 
were located in open view near major German cities, not hidden out in the 
mountains somewhere. In April 1933, the Nazis organized a national boycott 
of Jewish businesses. In July 1933, the Nazi Party was decreed the only legal 
party; furthermore, the Nazis stripped resident Polish Jews (who were about 
20% of German Jewry) of their German citizenship. In September 1933, Jews 
were stripped of the legal right to own land. In January 1934, Jews were 
kicked out of the German Labor Front, which was the unified trade union the 
Nazis had earlier created to replace all prior workers’ unions for all 
negotiations with industry.  In 1935, the Nazis prohibited Jews from serving in 
the military. Later that year, the Nuremburg Race Laws were passed, which 
defined Jews as a separate race; defined being Jewish not as practicing the 
faith, but as having at least three Jewish grandparents; stripped Jews of 
German citizenship; stripped Jews of the right to vote; and most notoriously 
forbad “Aryan” Germans from marrying or even having sexual relations with 
Jews. How many Germans could possibly have been ignorant of these laws? 
I won’t rehearse the rest of the timeline in much detail. Already in 
1937, the Nazis had set up the infamous traveling propaganda exhibition “The 
Eternal Jew.” In 1938, the Nazis moved to strip Jews of their wealth and to be 
readily identifiable as Jews. In late 1938, Polish Jews were expelled from 
Germany; when one of them assassinated a German diplomat, the Nazis 
orchestrated Kristallnacht. Jews were then kicked out of public schools and 
their businesses turned over to “Aryans.”  In 1939, with the conquest of 
Poland, Polish Jews were ordered to wear yellow stars of David and do forced 
labor. In 1940, German Jews started being shipped to the concentration camps 
as well. The year 1941 was crucial: with the war expanded to include Russia 
and then America, the Final Solution was decided upon. The Nazis forbad 
German Jews from emigrating, used poison gas to kill prisoners in the camps, 
and ordered SS killing squads to shoot massive numbers of Jews in Eastern 
Europe. In early 1942, the Final Solution was formalized in writing at the 
Wannsee Conference, and from this point on until their defeat in 1945, the 
Nazis gathered Jews from all over Europe with the plan of exterminating them 
all. 
Thus it seems obvious that, from early on, most of the German public 
must have known that the Jews were being specifically targeted for harsh 
measures, perhaps complete expulsion or outright death. It is important to 
keep in mind how extensive the Nazi concentration camp system was. During 
the dozen years the regime existed, it set up about 20,000 concentration 
                                                          
25 “Germany: Jewish Population in 1933,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 
accessed online at: https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005276.   
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camps,
26
 within which 11 million souls perished. The majority of those killed 
were Jews, but all of them were considered “enemies of the state.” As the war 
progressed, virtually the entire German public had to have been increasingly 
suspicious that the option of extermination had been chosen.  
This acceptance of (and even support for) absolute war against the 
Jews was precisely what the Nazis intended their anti-Semitic propaganda to 
engender. The Nazis intended to intensify the already culturally pervasive 
anti-Semitism of the German people. Cinema was considered by the Nazi 
Party to be an important tool in promoting an absolute war mindset. In other 
words, film was crucial to selling genocide. 
  
3. Marketing and Mechanisms 
I now turn to a review of some marketing tactics used in advertising 
and sales, as well as the psychological mechanisms that underlie them, before 
analyzing two of the films that were crucial in arousing the twin sides of anti-
Semitism—disgust at and fear of Jews. This will help us see how those tools 
were used to accomplish that goal.
27
 
 I will first briefly characterize propaganda
28
 and then explain how it 
relates to marketing. Some people regard propaganda as including techniques 
for selling products (goods and services) in a market. However, most people 
confine the term “propaganda” to the realm of ideas (specifically political, 
social, and religious ideas and ideologies),
29
 and confine the term “marketing” 
to the realm of the market (that is, the exchange of goods and services). 
 There is a common underlying activity in both marketing and 
propaganda: promotion, that is, attempted persuasion. Marketing (that is, sales 
and advertising) is used to attempt to persuade people either to support a 
brand or to adopt (buy) specific goods or services. Persuading someone to 
support a brand just means increasing the chances that person will buy 
products from that company in the future. Notice that I use “attempt to 
                                                          
26 “Nazi Camps,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, accessed online at: 
https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005144.  
 
27 I have written more extensively about this elsewhere; see Gary James Jason, Critical 
Thinking: Developing an Effective Worldview (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2001), esp. 
chap. 17 (on advertising and consumer choice) and chap. 18 (on political rhetoric and 
democratic choice). 
 
28 Two especially fine historical discussions of the multiple meanings of propaganda 
are Richard Taylor, Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, 2nd ed. 
(London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2009), pp. 7-17, and Randal Marlin, Propaganda 
and the Ethics of Persuasion, 2nd ed. (Buffalo, NY: Broadview Press, 2013), pp. 1-13. 
 
29 Historically, the term propaganda was originally used in the context of spreading 
(i.e., propagating) the Catholic faith. 
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persuade” rather than simply “persuade.” We use propaganda and marketing 
to persuade others, but of course we can and often do fail in the attempt.
30
  
 Propaganda and marketing both also involve symbolic messaging to 
attempt to convey feelings, thoughts, beliefs, concepts, values, emotions, and 
attitudes about their objects. Symbolic messaging systems include natural 
language, mathematics, music, art, film, photography, dance, flags, 
architecture, gestures, coins (or tokens), emblems, dress/uniforms, etc. 
 In light of these similarities and differences, I will use “propaganda” 
to mean: symbolic messaging intended to persuade a target audience to adopt 
the ideas, ideology, political policies, or candidates the propagandist desires 
them to adopt. I will use “marketing” to mean: symbolic messaging intended 
to persuade a target audience to buy the products or brand the marketer desires 
them to adopt.
31
  
The most effective marketing and propaganda techniques often 
employ psychological mechanisms that cognitive psychologists have explored 
over the last two decades. One the most eminent psychologists of persuasion 
is Robert Cialdini.
32
 Understanding his theory will help to shed light on how 
the Nazis so effectively used the medium of film for their purposes.  
Cialdini defines a psychological mechanism as a recurrent pattern of 
behavior whenever a specific “trigger” feature of the animal’s environment is 
encountered. His illustration is that of a turkey hen’s mothering behavior 
(pulling chicks beneath her wing, clearly a protective mechanism), which is 
triggered when the hen hears a specific “cheep-cheep” sound (typically issued 
by chicks in distress). Whether that sound is emitted by an actual chick, a tape 
recorder, or a tape recorder placed inside a stuffed skunk (the natural enemy 
of the turkey), the hen will scoop under her wing whatever makes that sound. 
The sound doesn’t make the hen “think” that her chick may be endangered; it 
is a trigger for behavior programmed in her by evolution. Parallel 
psychological mechanisms are found in humans. Some of the most common 
ones are: contrast, reciprocity, social proof, authority, sympathy, association, 
salience, and resentment of inequality.  
 “Contrast” refers to the tendency of people to judge a thing or 
situation by comparing it with things that are near it in time or physical  
proximity. For example, a group of male college students who watch a movie 
featuring beautiful young actresses and then are asked to rate pictures of 
coeds, will rate those young women as less attractive on average than will a 
matched group of male students who have not watched the movie. 
                                                          
30 Pro-Romney propaganda did not succeed in electing Mitt Romney in 2012, and all 
of the marketing for Blockbuster did not stop it from going out of business. 
 
31 We should note that the propagandist or marketer may be operating on his own 
behalf or on the behalf of another party paying him. 
 
32 Robert Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (New York: Morrow, 
1993). 
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 “Reciprocity” refers to the tendency of people to return favors for 
favors. That is, people who are given something tend to want to give 
something in return. For example, in one experiment, a psychology professor 
sent 100 Christmas cards to total strangers; 96 of them sent him back a card, 
even though they never heard of the researcher before. 
 “Social proof” refers to the tendency of people to judge what is 
correct or proper by looking at what other people around them think is correct 
or proper. For example, if a person goes to dinner with people he doesn’t 
know well, and (say) pizza is served, he will likely watch to see how the 
others eat it. Do they pick up slices by their hands, or do they transfer the 
slices to their plates and slice small portions off and eat them at the end of 
their forks? How others eat will influence how he eats.  
 “Authority” refers to the tendency of people to obey perceived 
figures of authority. A classic experiment by Stanley Milgram illustrates this 
well.
33
 Volunteers were told that they were going to participate in an 
experiment on learning. Each volunteer was told that he or she would be 
paired with another putative volunteer (who in reality was an actor paid to 
play the part). The real volunteer was invariably cast as the “teacher” and the 
actor would be the “learner.” The learner would be strapped in a chair with 
what appeared to be electrodes attached to him. The teacher would be told to 
read a question from a list to the learner, and when the learner answered 
incorrectly, the teacher would be instructed (by Milgram or his assistant, 
dressed in a white lab coat) to administer a shock by pushing a button on a 
panel. After each shock, the learner would feign pain. With each new wrong 
answer, the teacher would be instructed to increase the voltage. Milgram and 
his associates discovered to their surprise that most of the teachers, who were 
ordinary folks, would administer shocks up to what were labeled dangerous 
levels, even after the learner would cry out that he was having a heart attack 
and slump into apparent unconsciousness. People tend to obey authorities.  
 “Association” refers to the tendency of people (and animals) to infer 
causal connections between things they see associated in time or space. This 
tendency explains Pavlovian classical conditioning: if a bell rings before 
feeding dogs for a few days in a row, very quickly the dogs will associate the 
bell with the food and salivate at the sound. There is both negative and 
positive association. “Positive association” involves transferring or projecting 
one or more desirable qualities present in one object to some object 
temporally or spatially connected with it. In one classic experiment, young 
men shown a picture of a “concept car” (that is, a car not yet in production 
about which they could have had no prejudgments) with an attractive bikini-
clad model touching it rated the car as more attractive than did a matched 
group of young men seeing a picture of the exact same car without the sexy 
model. “Negative association” involves transferring or projecting one or more 
                                                          
33 See “Milgram Experiment,” s.v. Wikipedia, accessed online at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Milgram_experiment.  
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undesirable qualities present in one object to some object temporally or 
spatially connected with it. Studies of criminal trials show that men rated as 
unattractive by ordinary college student volunteers were twice as likely to be 
given jail sentences as were defendants the students rated as attractive. 
 Another mechanism is “salience,” which is when one focuses more 
upon the unusual features of a situation than the commonplace. That is, 
unusual features appear as more prominent in one’s awareness. For instance, 
in a robbery, the victim will tend to focus on the gun held by the robber than 
on his other features (such as hair color, clothing, etc.). 
 Cialdini and other psychologists have shown that these mechanisms 
are exploited in both marketing and propaganda. A few examples will suffice 
for our purpose.   
 Let us consider the mechanism of negative association. It is behind 
many ads that aim to arouse fear, disgust, or hatred of a thing by (often 
irrelevantly) linking something unpleasant to it. For example, an advertiser of 
mouthwash might show attractive women turning away from a young man as 
he tries to talk with them. The advertiser is hoping the viewers will transfer 
their fears of social rejection to failing to use that brand of mouthwash. 
Similarly, an ad for a candidate may show his or her opponent’s picture 
juxtaposed with a closed factory. The campaign staff is hoping that the viewer 
will transfer his or her negative feelings about unemployment to the 
candidate’s opponent. A particularly egregious case of this was the infamous 
“Daisy ad” run by Lyndon Johnson’s U.S. presidential campaign against 
Barry Goldwater in 1964, which pictured a little girl pulling leaves from a 
daisy shortly before an atomic bomb detonates.
34
 
 Next, we’ll consider the use of social proof in advertising. A 
marketer might advertise a food supplement by featuring letters of satisfied 
customers who rave about how effective it is at (say) invigorating the sex 
drive. The advertiser is hoping that the viewer will follow the example of all 
those satisfied customers. Similarly, a candidate’s campaign staff might stage 
a campaign rally in which hundreds of that candidate’s supporters gather, 
listening to him or her deliver a standard vapid speech and cheering him or her 
after every line. The staff is hoping that the viewer will follow the example of 
all those adoring supporters. 
 Finally, consider the use of authority in advertising. The producer of 
one multi-vitamin pill advertised it under the name “God’s Recipe.” The 
advertiser was hoping that the viewer would feel a duty to obey God’s will 
and buy the product. Similarly, a political candidate’s staff might approach 
local pastors in an area to have them publicly support the candidate. The staff 
is hoping that the parishioners will obey the recommendations of their pastors 
and vote for the candidate.  
                                                          
34 The “Daisy ad” can be viewed on the Internet at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dDTBnsqxZ3k.  
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 These mechanisms can be utilized in combination. For example, both 
social proof and authority can be used together powerfully in advertising. The 
producer of a pain medication might show actors in white coats simulating 
doctors and speaking about how effective the medication is. Similarly, a 
candidate’s campaign team might run an ad with professors of (say) 
philosophy speaking about what an outstanding candidate he or she is. In both 
cases, the appeal is to the social proof of many people, all appearing to be 
some kind of relevant authority.  
 
4. Robert and Bertram 
 Armed with an overview of psychological mechanisms that have 
been exploited in illogical but persuasive marketing and propaganda 
campaigns, let us now review two of the major Nazi anti-Semitic movies. As 
David Welch notes,
35
 anti-Semitism was common in Nazi cinema from the 
first. He gives as examples the Kampfzeit
36
 films, such as Hans Westmar (in 
which Jews are portrayed as dividing workers from the government), 
Homecoming (which portrayed Jews as inciting the Poles to attack the ethnic 
Germans), and Bismark (about a Jewish man who attempted to assassinate the 
Iron Chancellor).  However, feature films that clearly intended to advance the 
anti-Semitic core of Nazism were rather late in coming.  
The first such feature film was produced right after Kristallnacht 
(1938) and released in 1939. It was a musical comedy called Robert and 
Bertram, set in 1839, and written and directed by Hans H. Zerlett. Zerlett 
specialized in musicals and comedies, and was one of Joseph Goebbels’s 
preferred directors.  
 The movie opens with the intertitle, “This is a story of two 
vagabonds . . . who in spite of their misdeeds, ended up in heaven . . . because 
they possessed the fairest of all human virtues: Gratitude!” We are introduced 
to a fair-haired young man, Michel, who is carving a heart on a tree with the 
name “Lenchen” underneath, and the gorgeous fair-haired Lenchen, who is 
the tart-tongued daughter of innkeeper Mr. Lieps. Michel joins Lenchen at 
work; while he is shy and tongue-tied around her, it is clear that they are in 
love. Michel lets her know he is going to Berlin to serve in the Prussian army. 
Lenchen gives Michel some ham to take to his uncle, the warden of the town’s 
jail. 
 We then meet two vagabonds: the tall, thin Robert, in jail already, 
and the fat, short Bertram.
37
 Bertram is arrested in mid-dream, taken to the 
                                                          
35 David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945 (London: I. B. 
Taurus & Co. Ltd., 2007), p. 238. 
 
36 The term means “time of struggle,” and refers to the period when the Nazis were 
contending with communist and socialist parties for power.  
 
37 The pair of comics resembles to some degree Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, a 
popular American comic team of the time.  
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same jail, and put in a cell directly below Robert. Robert cuts a hole in the 
floor of his cell and, seeing Bertram (the two are obviously close friends), 
pulls him up. They then manage to escape, after tricking the warden and his 
nephew Michel. Throughout all of this, various characters sing and dance. 
 Robert and Bertram find their way to Lenchen’s village. She kindly 
offers them food if they will wash dishes in her father’s inn at that night’s 
wedding celebration. At the wedding, the rogues overhear Biedermeier, a 
seemingly wealthy money lender, trying to force Lenchen to marry him. He 
threatens Mr. Liep that unless he pushes his daughter into the marriage, 
Biedermeier will take over the inn. The two rogues decide to help. After 
entertaining the guests with a song and dance routine, they steal Biedermeir’s 
wallet and ride off on stolen horses.  
Later, they discover that Biedermeier is himself in debt to one 
Nathan Ipelmeyer and being pressured to pay back the money he had 
borrowed. Robert sarcastically remarks to Bertram, “We’ve stepped right into 
the midst of the business relations of two especially fine gentlemen.” The 
clever Robert explains to Bertram that Biedermeier borrowed the money to 
support Lieps’s Inn only in order to make Lieps and his daughter dependent 
upon Biedermeier, thus forcing Lenchen to marry him. Robert and Bertram, 
grateful for the hospitality they received from Lieps and his daughter, again 
decide to help.  
They sell the stolen horses and go to Berlin to con Ipelmeyer. We see 
them in Berlin, dressed like gentlemen, where they contrive to greet each 
other in a restaurant Ipelmeyer frequents. We see him sitting there—corpulent, 
repellent looking, hook-nosed, and bearded, with flashy clothes and jewelry, 
ordering caviar. The rogues con him into believing that Bertram is a professor 
of music, giving lessons to Robert, who is passed off as a Count (“the Count 
of Monte Cristo”). Ipelmeyer, an obvious social climber, invites them to a 
costume ball. We know that Ipelmeyer is Jewish from an infamous exchange: 
he leans forward and says to Bertram, “But first I have to tell you a big secret: 
I am an Israelite.” The corpulent Bertram immediately replies, “Then I have to 
tell you a big secret as well—I have a [big] belly.” This retort implies that 
Ipelmeyer is obviously Jewish by his looks. 
We now see Ipelmeyer in his garishly ornate house, on the night of 
the masked ball. He gives directions to his servant Jacques, saying, “I beg you 
to get rid of your Jewish pronunciation.” Ipelmeyer then turns as his wife 
enters and ironically says “Oi!” She is also enormously obese, hook-nosed, 
and gaudily dressed with flashy jewelry. When she asks him (in Yiddish) how 
she looks, he replies, “From the front you look nebbish like Catherine the 
Great, and from the back you look healthy like Napoleon.” She objects, saying 
that Napoleon was anti-Semitic, to which he replies, “That’s why he went bust 
in Moscow,” implying that the Soviet Union is controlled by Jews.  
As the guests arrive, Ipelmeyer greets his secretary Fochheimer, 
letting him know that he realizes Fochheimer has been stealing from him and 
having sex with his wife. Then the rogues arrive. As the music plays, we see 
Ipelmeyer caress not his wife’s hand, but her rings. As she smiles at him, he 
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rolls his eyes. It is obvious that there is no love there. We see Robert lean over 
to Ipelmeyer, and again we get some anti-Semitic dialogue:  
 
Robert: Your home seems to be a true temple of the arts. 
Ipelmeyer: What do you mean, temple? Are you also . . . [Jewish]? 
Robert: Me? No. How could I be? 
Ipelmeyer: Who knows . . . I know an archbishop named Kohn and a 
lord named Rothschild. 
 
The insinuation here is that Jews work their way into high places incognito. 
 After Robert sings an aria, the guests change into their costumes. At 
the costume ball, we hear more anti-Semitic dialogue. Mrs. Ipelmeyer, when 
Fochheimer touches her, tells him to take his hand away. When he asks her 
how she knew it was him, she replies, “Because of your feet”—presumably, a 
dig at how he smells.
38
 We then see a guest greet Ipelmeyer by name, who 
replies, “Who says I’m Mr. Ipelmeyer?” The guest shoots back, “If I couldn’t 
tell by the pronunciation, I would know by your wayward glances at the dance 
soloist.” Ipelmeyer goes on to make clear he intends to bed her (presumably a 
non-Jewish girl). We also see Jacques refer to Mrs. Ipelmeyer as looking like 
“a filthy old market bag.”  
Jacques also says of the Ipelmeyers’ daughter, Isadora, that she came 
as Queen “Kleptomania,” meaning Queen Cleopatra—a gibe at the presumed 
acquisitiveness of the family.  An earlier scene showed the Ipelmeyers hoping 
that Isadora will marry the “Count of Monte Cristo.” We now see a scene that 
mocks the values of the daughter. When her boyfriend Samuel asks how she 
could fall for “a goy” (referring to Robert), she replies “But he’s a Count. A 
Count!” When Ipelmeyer hears this, he tells Samuel that he is too poor to 
marry Isadora: “My daughter will not love for less than a million.” 
 Ipelmeyer then walks into the young dance soloist’s room, intent on a 
tryst with the maiden. Outside, the guests all dance, with Robert taking 
Isadora as partner, while Bertram takes Mrs. Ipelmeyer. As they all dance, the 
two rogues adroitly steal their partners’ jewelry. This happens while 
Ipelmeyer, whose doctor had given him a sleeping potion, falls asleep. 
 The mother and daughter soon discover that they have been robbed, 
and the mother cries out for her husband, who is being robbed by the two 
rogues while he sleeps. As the guests shout and beat at his door, the rogues 
calmly take all of his jewelry, down to his diamond shoe-buckles. As the 
rogues make their escape and the guests flee, Jacques wryly remarks, “Now 
they’re all galloping in Jewish haste!” 
 We cut to the Lieps sadly discussing how they will lose the inn 
because they cannot pay back Biedermeier, when the postman delivers a 
package for the father and a letter for the daughter. In the package is the stolen 
jewelry, with the letter instructing them to give the stolen goods to “the man 
                                                          
38 Hitler makes a similar gibe in Mein Kampf, p. 57. 
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who is after Lenchen” (meaning Biedermeier) and to tell him that the jewelry 
belongs to the Ipelmeyers. Returning the jewelry to Ipelmeyer will clear 
Biedermeier’s bills as well as theirs. At this point, Michel—looking 
resplendent in his Prussian uniform and walking with pride and confidence—
enters and says to the Lieps, “See what the Prussians can turn a man into!” As 
the father slips away, Michel kisses Lenchen and presents her with a ring. The 
father tells his friends that Michel has become a corporal (which was Hitler’s 
rank).  
We next see an intertitle with a police indictment of two unknown 
men named Robert and Bertram for theft. The top minister is puzzled, because 
the two crooks “didn’t commit their crimes to further their own interests.” We 
cut to Michel and Lenchen strolling at the town fair, and we see the two 
rogues (dressed as women) reading a poster offering a reward for their 
capture. While dancing a polka, they are discovered and pursued. They jump 
into a balloon, which carries them to heaven, where they dance past the pearly 
gates in the midst of angels. 
Some commentators have regarded this film as being not markedly 
anti-Semitic, and thus not particularly effective as propaganda. For example, 
in his comprehensive treatise on German propaganda cinema, Ian Garden says 
that while the movie did in fact caricature Jews, it isn’t particularly 
remarkable in this regard. As he puts it, “While there are certainly some 
stereotypical presentations of the Jewish characters in the film . . . there is 
nothing particularly offensive about the portrayals. Indeed, it is more 
reminiscent of the clichéd portrayals of the national characteristics of (say) the 
Scots or the French.” He adds that “just as much fun is poked at non-Jewish 
characters, and the real villains are the two non-Jewish vagabonds who steal 
jewelry from Ipelmeyer, but who are still accepted into heaven because their 
crimes were not committed for personal gain but to insure the happiness of the 
two lovers.”39 
This strikes me as mistaken for several reasons. First, none of the 
other characters is singled out for such vicious stereotypical satirization. The 
Jews are portrayed as greedy, lacking in taste, lacking in hygiene, uniformly 
ugly, dishonest, and so on, especially in comparison with the blond, 
wholesome, Aryan lovers.  
Second, Garden seems to equate Jewishness with a separate 
nationality (like being Scottish or French), as if Jewish Germans aren’t truly 
Germans. The fact that the Nuremberg Laws were passed to define who was 
Jewish is strong evidence that most German Jews in fact looked and sounded 
like other Germans. 
Most importantly, Garden overlooks the main argument for 
recognizing this as effective propaganda. The film clearly presents the idea 
that theft from Jews is praiseworthy and noble if it is done to help “Aryans.” 
                                                          
39 Ian Garden, The Third Reich’s Celluloid War: Propaganda in Nazi Feature Films, 
Documentaries, and Television (Gloucestershire, UK: The History Press, 2012), p. 74. 
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Considering that to a large degree the Nazis funded their Wehrmacht by assets 
seized from Jews, down to the gold in the teeth of Jews killed in the 
extermination camps, this message was very much a Nazi one.  
 This movie was in fact powerfully effective in promoting the ideas 
and emotions the Nazis wanted to arouse against the Jews. The film is selling 
three feelings about the out-group Jews, which would increase tolerance of a 
total genocidal war against them: difference, disgust, and danger. Let us take 
these in order, and see which scenes in the film fit each category. 
By “difference” I mean elaborating and reinforcing the false 
stereotype that Jews look, talk, and think differently from “Aryan” Germans. 
Numerous scenes highlight the alleged difference of Jews (from other 
Germans). A few examples include: the scene of Ipelmeyer in the restaurant, 
odd looking, peculiarly dressed, and ordering caviar; the scene where Bertram 
tells Ipelmeyer (in effect) that Ipelmeyer’s appearance is obviously “Jewish”; 
the size of the Ipelmeyer house and its ornate furnishings; the scenes showing 
Ipelmeyer’s wife as different in her physical appearance and attire; the scenes 
showing various members of the Ipelmeyer household speaking German with 
Yiddish words mixed in; the scenes where Ipelmeyer disregards his wife’s 
infidelity and those that accentuate his own; the scene where he caresses not 
his wife’s hand, but her jewelry; and the scenes in which Ipelmeyer and 
Samuel refer to ordinary Germans as “Goyim.”  
By “disgust” I mean emphasizing that not only are Jews different, but 
that their differences are all for the worse. After all, you can view other people 
as having customs that are different from your own, but still regard them as 
benign or even charming. Here, Jewish manners are portrayed as loathsome, 
dirty, or even degenerate. Their appearance is portrayed not merely as 
different, but as ugly and repellent. Their values are portrayed not merely as 
different, but as corrupt and vicious. Numerous scenes in the movie are 
designed to arouse disgust toward Jews: the scenes showing Ipelmeyer and his 
wife as ugly and obese, the scene in which Mrs. Ipelmeyer insinuates that her 
lover is malodorous, the scene in which Ipelmeyer rolls his eyes at the sight of 
his wife, the scene in which even the Ipelmeyers’ servant makes fun of her 
looks, the scene in which Ipelmeyer shows tolerance of the fact that his wife is 
cheating on him, the scenes showing Ipelmeyer lusting after the young dancer, 
the scenes showing all of the Ipelmeyers desiring the daughter to marry 
royalty rather than the man who loves her, and the scenes showing how 
devoted the family is to their material possessions. 
The difference and disgust are underlined by contrast with the 
virtuous, modestly dressed, truly loving, honest, hard-working, physically fit, 
and beautiful lead characters (Lenchen and Michel). Even the rogues come off 
as good by contrast, with their gratitude and charm. 
By “danger” I mean that the Jews are portrayed as dangerous or a 
threat to other Germans for several reasons: they steal from Aryans; they are 
disloyal and “cosmopolitan” as opposed to being patriotic; they use their 
financial and media power to advance their international agenda at the 
expense of the nation; and they lust after non-Jewish girls—again using their 
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wealth as a weapon to threaten “racial pollution.” Numerous scenes aim at 
portraying Jews in this fashion. The scenes showing Biedermeier using 
Lieps’s debt to pressure Lieps into forcing Lenchen to marry Biedermeier, and 
Ipelmeyer in turn squeezing Biedermeier, portray Jews as money-lenders who 
use usury as a tool of power. The scenes of Ipelmeyer lusting after the young 
dancer and Biedermeier after Lenchen suggest the constant danger of “racial 
pollution” of Aryans by Jews. 
These messages are usually hidden by the musical numbers and 
dances. In terms of marketing, this is analogous to using jingles to distract the 
viewer from thinking rationally about the product being sold. Indeed, this 
point illustrates one of the major features of cinema that makes it potentially a 
powerful tool for propaganda: it is a multi-media art. It combines the power of 
writing to convey information verbally with the power of visual messages and 
music to distract rational thought.                
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
5. Linen from Ireland 
 The second film under review is unusual in that it is at once anti-
Semitic and anti-capitalist (or at least anti-classical-liberal). I will focus here 
only on its anti-Semitism. Linen from Ireland was directed by Heinz Helbig, is 
set in 1909 Bohemia, and appeared in 1939 only a few months after Robert 
and Bertram.  
 The film opens with simple, folksy weavers walking in the summer 
sun to deliver their products to a factory, owned by a man named 
Hubermayer. As they discuss how much they will be paid, one of them 
remarks of Hubermayer, “Such a rich, fine gentleman. He still has a heart for 
us simple weavers.”  
We cut to Hubermayer meeting with two men from Prague who 
represent a firm called Libussa, Inc. One of the men says to Hubermayer, “We 
can’t force you to do what’s good for you. If you think you can get along 
without us, very well.” Hubermayer turns to the men, angrily calling them and 
their firm cutthroats and crooks. He opens a side door to show them a year’s 
supply of linen, unused and stored because Libussa has refused to buy from 
him. They tell him that it’s because his product is bad, but he vehemently 
rejects that claim—his company has been producing the same good linen for 
150 years. When one of the Libussa representatives asks why he continues to 
produce linen nobody is buying, he points to the weavers waiting outside—
“Isn’t that reason enough? Do you want them to starve, you scoundrels?” 
 Hubermayer capitulates in order to provide for the weavers he wants 
to save. Under the new contract, he becomes a silent partner with only a 10% 
stake in the company and is no longer part of management, which will be 
taken over by a man named Nagel. He demands that the contract guarantee 
that the new management will buy from the town weavers for at least twenty 
years, but the Libussa representatives just laugh and refuse, holding out the 
prospect that the weavers will get nothing today. He reluctantly signs, and 
Nagel goes out to tell the weavers that they will deal with him from now on 
and work just as before. As the Libussa representatives leave, Hubermayer 
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tells his assistant that he has been given the boot, and he will go to the Kaiser 
if necessary.  
 We next witness the board of directors of Libussa Textile Industries 
as they consider presenting a petition to the government to be allowed to 
import linen from Ireland tariff-free. Dr. Kuhn, the Jewish chairman of the 
board, promises that if they can get the government to remove the tariffs on 
imported linen, Libussa will become a powerful multinational company.  
When one of the other board members suggests that the government’s 
Minister of Trade and Commerce will not go along with the scheme, Kuhn 
indicates that he has insider knowledge that there is soon to be a new minister 
in charge. When another board member asks  what  the domestic linen-makers 
will say about this, he smugly replies that he anticipated resistance, so he 
“quietly bought” the Bohemian linen companies “one after another” so there 
would be no opposition.  To another board member’s query about what will 
then happen to the weavers, he disdainfully replies, “Any progress demands 
sacrifice. . . . [T]here is more at stake here than the fate of a few weavers.”  It 
is them or the weavers; they all sign the petition. 
 After the other members have gone, Kuhn goes into the president’s 
office, and finds Lilly Kettner, the beautiful blond daughter of the company’s 
president. She mockingly compliments him on all he’s accomplished. When 
he responds that he has done all of this for Libussa, she replies, “And also for 
me. I know.” When he says to her that he hasn’t done anything to her, she 
replies, “I can’t avoid the impression that if I [gave] you my little finger you’ll 
take my whole hand. And [if you take] my hand . . . .”  
At this point, Lilly’s father walks in. She hears Kuhn report to 
Kettner that the board has agreed and the company can now submit their 
petition. Kuhn also lets Kettner know that he has arranged a formal dinner in 
Vienna that Kettner and Lilly must attend.  At this, Lilly gets annoyed, telling 
Kuhn that she isn’t his employee. Her father tells her, though, “We must do as 
we are told.” As he leaves, Kuhn smirks at Lilly. When Kuhn is out of the 
room, Lilly tells her father that Kuhn is revolting. 
We cut to the exterior of the Imperial Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce where a sign states: “Not open to the public today.”  The new 
Minister walks in, and we learn that he is from the Liberal Democratic Party 
(presumably, a party that favors classical liberal economics, such as free 
trade). The new Minister introduces himself, declaring bluntly that he wants to 
implement sweeping reforms as quickly as possible. He tells the staff that he 
wants to end the narrowness of the previous administration and sweep away 
barriers to trade, even if a few of the “little guys” may complain: “Our 
commerce must conquer the world market!”   
We next cut to Kuhn’s Vienna hotel room, where his uncle Sigi 
Pollack is announced. Kuhn welcomes his uncle, who is obese, bearded, with 
of course the stereotypical aquiline nose. Pollack, inspecting the room and 
noticing the large bathtub, asks Kuhn how long he intends to stay. When 
Kuhn replies, “three or four days,” Pollack replies, “Why do you need a 
bathroom [with a bathtub] then?” This is again the Hitlerian gibe alleging that 
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Jews do not bathe often. Pollack comments on how fine Kuhn’s clothes are, 
adding “You’ve become a big shot” who has come a long way in twenty years 
from their old Jewish neighborhood. This irritates Kuhn, who says, “Please 
stop that, Uncle. I’ve forgotten where I came from.” As they stand side by 
side, the viewer sees that while Pollack has a beard and his nephew Kuhn is 
clean-shaven and more polished, the subtext is that “they” (that is, the Jews) 
are the same. You can take the Jew out of the ghetto, the film urges, but you 
can’t take the ghetto out of the Jew.  
When Pollack tells Kuhn, “You’ve made a great career,” Kuhn 
replies, “This is only the beginning.” Kuhn explains that he is ambitious 
beyond Austro-Hungary, which he views as small: “Berlin, Paris, London, 
New York—That’s my world! That’s where I belong.” In that world, he says, 
he will have wealth, status, and—even more importantly—power: “And I will 
come into power! I’ll be at the top and others will obey.” Kuhn adds that on 
that day he will celebrate by marrying Lilly Kettner. He reveals that this is 
why he engineered the petition, namely, so that “the old man will have to give 
me his daughter, whether he wants to or not.”  
 At the ball, we see Kuhn waiting for Goll, the new ministry official 
who will consider Libussa’s petition. Goll arrives late; he is young, handsome, 
and charming. Kuhn has a servant tell Lilly to meet her father in the library, 
but when she walks in, only Kuhn is there. Closing the door, he tells her it 
would be very helpful to Libussa if she were nice to one guest in particular 
(meaning Goll), because “every man has his price.” She responds that she 
wants nothing to do with Kuhn’s dealings, and won’t dance with some old 
bureaucrat. She tells Kuhn angrily that she will dance with the first young man 
she sees, and leaves. She asks the first young man to dance with her—and 
Kuhn smiles when he sees that it is Goll. When Lilly discovers that the young 
man she has just danced with is from the Ministry, she gets flustered and 
leaves him. He is obviously attracted to her, and is told by his friend and 
superior, a Baron, that she is the niece of the party’s hostess and the heiress to 
a large company. He is puzzled why she would want to dance with him. 
We next see Kuhn apologize to Lilly, saying that the person with 
whom he wanted her to dance won’t be coming to the party after all. She 
laughs and says, “So I won’t be able to do the company any more favors 
tonight?” He replies that she should enjoy herself, “laughing, dancing, and 
flirting.” We cut to Goll preparing to leave the party, but when Lilly comes up 
and asks him to stay, he does.  They are now clearly falling in love, and the 
scene dissolves with them sitting and talking in the garden. 
We cut to the front door of the ministry. Hubermayer is also there to 
present a petition. We then see Goll waking up his friend—the whimsical 
Baron—telling the Baron that he wants to discuss official business. The Baron 
asks Goll whether this is about Lilly Kettner. Goll, surprised, asks the man 
how he knew. The Baron tells him that Lilly is rich and Goll isn’t. The man 
suggests that Lilly must have some ulterior motive for “bewitching a minor 
official.”  
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That afternoon, Kuhn goes in to meet Goll. Goll doesn’t remember 
him, and Kuhn reminds him they met at the ball the night before. Goll asks 
why he is there and Kuhn indicates that it is about the Libussa petition. While 
Goll finds the petition and reads it, Kuhn pitches the proposal. Goll tells Kuhn 
he will read it and reach a decision. Kuhn becomes pushy, revealing to him 
that Libussa’s president (and Kuhn’s boss) is Lilly’s father. The oily Kuhn 
reminds Goll that Lilly was enthralled by him. Goll replies, “Now I 
understand this connection,” and summarily asks Kuhn to leave, saying he 
will study the petition. 
We see Kuhn return to his apartment, and he discovers Pollack in the 
bathtub. Pollack tells Kuhn he wants to bathe and shave off his beard, 
presumably so that he can insinuate himself into high society as well. Kuhn 
and Pollack hatch a plan to have a friend, who is an editor, print a story that 
the top minister of trade is insincere in his support for the expansion of 
German trade because he ignores “a brilliant industrial magnate from Prague” 
who has a proposal that could do wonders for the textile industry.  
We cut to see the visibly angry Minister reading this story aloud to 
his underlings, demanding a written report on this sabotage of his instructions.  
Hubermayer then knocks on the doors in the Ministry with his petition. In a 
comedy of errors, the Minister takes Hubermayer to be the brilliant 
industrialist from Prague. Hubermayer hands his proposal to the confused 
Minister, who takes it to be the Kuhn proposal, and tells Hubermayer that it 
will be handled “at once.” The Minister explains that he knows all about the 
Libussa plan to import linen duty-free from Ireland, because “not enough [of 
it] can be produced in Bohemia.” Hubermayer shows utter amazement on his 
face as he listens. As the confused Minister tells Hubermayer that Goll is 
studying the proposal, Hubermayer begins to figure out Kuhn’s scheme. He 
grabs his petition back from the Minister and goes off to find Goll’s office. 
We cut to Goll and Lilly strolling in a garden. Goll thanks her for 
putting in a good word about him to Kuhn, and Lilly replies that she never 
mentioned him to Kuhn.  When Goll asks whether she knows who is to decide 
on Kuhn’s petition, she replies that she neither knows nor cares: “I don’t like 
to be used for the interests of Herr Kuhn.” She adds—to Goll’s evident 
delight—that she hates Kuhn. Someone is lurking in the bushes watching the 
couple. 
We later see Kuhn in his office, and we find that it was Pollack 
spying on the couple. Kuhn instructs Pollack to follow them when they meet 
again the next day. Kuhn then receives a call from the top minister, after 
which the smirking Kuhn hands Pollack some money and says the minister 
has told him Libussa’s petition will be granted. Pollack reminds him that it 
was Pollack’s idea to publish the letter, and says that the business is as good 
as settled. “[B]ut what about love?” Kuhn smirks again and says the settling of 
the business will settle the love, and gloats, “There’s no one left to stop me!” 
In Goll’s office, Hubermayer searches the desk and finds the 
Kuhn/Libussa petition. We cut again to Kettner’s room, with Kuhn waiting as 
Kettner calls out for his daughter to get ready. Kettner observes that since she 
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is taking unusually long, she must want to look unusually pretty. Kuhn 
suggests it is because they are meeting Goll, and tells Kettner that Goll is the 
man considering the Libussa petition, and Lilly has been seeing Goll every 
day. Kuhn deviously adds that Goll had pretensions of integrity, and is their 
strongest opponent at the ministry. Kettner falls for this line, saying of Goll 
sarcastically that he is a fine fellow “who could cost us millions.”  
Kettner angrily goes to Lilly’s room to confront her. She readily 
admits to seeing Goll and wanting to marry him. Kettner tells her that he 
doesn’t dislike Goll, but wants her to marry someone who can take over and 
run Libussa, but that Goll opposes the petition and wants to thwart Libussa’s 
plans. Kettner tells his daughter that she must test Goll by convincing him to 
support the petition. This clearly bothers her. She asks her father that if Goll 
goes against his own convictions just to win her hand, what would Kettner 
really think of him? When her father replies that he would view Goll as being 
intelligent, she reluctantly agrees to try to convince Goll to support the 
petition. 
We watch next as both Goll and then Lilly walk into a restaurant. 
Goll asks her if he can go to her father and ask for her hand. She looks 
uncomfortable as she replies that she has already talked with her father about 
him, and while her father has no objections to him, if Goll is to join the 
family, Goll would have to “lend [Kettner] your support just as a son would.” 
When Goll says, “Yes . . . And . . . ?” Lilly replies that Goll should approve 
the Libussa petition, or there will be no marriage. Goll is incredulous that 
Kettner should expect him to act against conviction, but indicates that he will, 
although he is clearly disappointed in her. 
The next morning, Goll goes to the ministry early, and when he 
enters his office, finds Hubermayer sitting at the desk. Hubermayer tells Goll 
cheekily that he is almost done. When Goll angrily demands to know who he 
is, Hubermayer identifies himself and proceeds to tell Goll that Hubermayer’s 
company and all the other domestic wholesale linen producers were ruined by 
Libussa to keep them from opposing Libussa’s proposal. Hubermayer tells 
Goll that if the Libussa petition is approved, the company will then shut all the 
domestic producers down, adding: “Do you know how many families will 
starve?” Goll tells the hot-headed Hubermayer to calm down, that he has 
already suspected what Hubermayer has discovered, and that the matter is still 
open. Goll sits with the petition and asks Hubermayer answer some questions. 
 Meanwhile, Kuhn enters Lilly’s room and congratulates her for 
helping her family’s company. When she tells Kuhn that the petition matter is 
still undecided, the smarmy Kuhn replies that he is confident Goll’s love for 
her will overcome Goll’s reservations about the petition. She shoots back that 
not all men are as unprincipled as Kuhn, adding that “Doctor Goll will never 
act against his convictions.” Kuhn haughtily replies, “We’ll see.” 
Back at the Ministry, we see Goll dictating a report (in Hubermayer’s 
presence). The Baron calls him into another office, and when Goll confirms 
that he is recommending rejection of the Libussa petition, the Baron points out 
that the head of the Ministry wants it approved and that Goll’s career will end 
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ignominiously if he refuses. Goll immediately replies that this is unimportant 
compared to “preventing hundreds of thousands from perishing.” The Baron 
agrees, but says that if the Minister wills it, there is nothing Goll can do about 
it—Goll will just be sacked and replaced by someone willing to sign. When 
Goll and the Baron are summoned to the Minister’s office, the Minister says 
to Goll, “So, you’re the revolutionary!” The Minister quotes Goll’s report 
with hostility, amazed that Goll would go against the Minister’s wishes, and 
orders Goll to write a positive report. Goll refuses, and says he is prepared for 
the consequences. The Minister tells the Baron to write a favorable report and 
then phones Kettner. 
We cut to Kettner, Kuhn, and Lilly in Kettner’s hotel room, as the 
phone rings. Kuhn answers, thanks the Minister obsequiously, and then relays 
to Kettner that they are to show up at the Ministry tomorrow to receive their 
petition’s formal approval. Kuhn suggests to Kettner that this was done with 
Goll’s approval and, smirking at Lilly, with Lilly’s help. Lilly hotly retorts 
that she thinks he is lying, and that Goll wouldn’t go against his convictions. 
We cut to Lilly and Goll separately entering the Baron’s office. Lilly 
tells him she is disappointed that he caved to the pressure and wants to see 
him no more. Stricken, he leaves, and as she cries, the Baron—realizing her 
innocence in the Libussa scheme—tells her he owes her an apology. 
The next day, we see the Minister telling Kettner and Kuhn that the 
Libussa petition has been approved. He opens an envelope to check that it is 
the approval form, but as he reads it, he suddenly tells Kettner and Kuhn that 
there is a minor error in it, so he will have to sign it and mail it to them. They 
leave suspecting nothing. After the Libussa executives leave, we learn what 
was really in the letter—Goll’s resignation, with the explanation that the 
Minister is acting against the interests of the people. Outside, Kettner tells 
Kuhn that he wants to stay and talk with Goll personally.  Kettner enters 
Goll’s office, only to find Hubermayer. The ever-gruff Hubermayer tells 
Kettner that Goll has resigned because of “the Libussa rabble.”   At this point 
the Minister calls Goll’s office, whereupon Hubermayer picks up the phone 
and tells the Minister that Goll has quit “this Imperial pigsty!” The Minister is 
incensed, and tells the staff what the ministry has been called, and the staff 
march to Goll’s office to see what person would dare say such a thing. 
The staff members enter to find a defiant Hubermayer (with Kettner 
standing quietly to the side). They usher Hubermayer to the Minister directly, 
but to the Minister’s surprise, Hubermayer is not cowed, refuses to apologize, 
and accuses the Minister of not caring about the citizens who will starve. As 
Kettner quietly enters the room, Hubermayer shouts at the Minister that 
Libussa lowered its prices for cloth from the domestic manufacturers so as to 
push them into bankruptcy and buy them out cheaply. He and the Minister 
argue, whereupon Hubermayer calls the Libussa petition a “swindle.” The 
Minister wants to call the police, but Kettner intercedes, saying that 
Hubermayer’s outrage is reasonable. He then identifies himself to 
Hubermayer as “the swindler, the cutthroat.” Kettner tells the Minister that 
because of what he has learned from Hubermayer, he wants to withdraw his 
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petition. Hubermayer apologizes for his intemperate comments, and he and 
the Minister become amicable. 
We move now to Goll’s apartment, as he is packing to go. The 
Baron, ever his true friend, is explaining to Goll that he is wrong about 
Lilly—she was crying because she thought that Goll had given in to the 
petition, not opposed it. While Goll finally grasps what the Baron is saying, 
Goll says he still didn’t like being played with and still plans to leave town. 
We see a triumphant Kuhn enter his hotel room and tell Pollack that 
he anticipates winning Lilly’s hand.  Pollack replies in joy, “If only your 
mama, my sister, could have lived to see this!”   Kettner enters his room, 
accompanied by Hubermayer—the two are now obviously friends. Kettner 
says to Hubermayer that he now realizes he has been duped by someone, and 
he intends to clear everything up with Hubermayer there. Meanwhile, the 
Baron visits Lilly in her room, where she is packing to leave. 
We see a servant announce to Kettner that Kuhn wants to see him. 
Kettner tells the man to bring Kuhn in, sarcastically saying to Hubermayer, “I 
have to take stock with my capable Doctor Kuhn.” Back in Kuhn’s room, 
Pollack pops the cork on the champagne and sloppily pours some for Kuhn 
and himself, toasting “L’chaim!” The servant comes in and tells Kuhn that 
Kettner will see him now. Kuhn smugly gloats to Pollack, “Now I’ll name my 
price! . . . Uncle Sigi, I’ve reached my goal!” Pollack replies, “Mazeltov!” 
Back in Lilly’s room, we see the Baron—obviously playing Cupid 
for the stubborn young lovers—finally get through to her that in fact Goll had 
rejected the petition, and that’s why he resigned. He tells her that Goll is 
leaving on the 1:00 pm train, and the two leave immediately, with Lilly saying 
that she will drag him off the train if necessary. 
Kuhn enters Kettner’s room and congratulates Kettner in a self-
serving manner, saying it wasn’t easy, but Kuhn’s skill in manipulation paid 
off.  Kettner cagily replies that that it is now time to revise their relationship. 
Kuhn, ever confident, thinks Kettner is hinting at elevating him. He insolently 
tells Kettner that he wants no money, but wants instead to marry Lilly. Kettner 
lets Kuhn have it, telling him that he is untrustworthy, has deceived Kettner 
for years, and has cheated honest businessmen in Kettner’s name. Kettner 
fires Kuhn, saying, “Maybe our Fatherland is too small for your urges.” He 
hands Kuhn a severance check and says that he has withdrawn the Libussa 
petition: “It’s useless to give you my reasons. You would never understand 
them anyway.” The disgraced Kuhn slinks out. 
Kuhn, back with Pollack, tells his uncle that he’s been fired and he 
did not get Lilly’s hand in marriage. He hands Pollack the check, and says, 
“Buy two tickets for New York. Europe is not for us.” Pollack, impressed by 
the check, tells Kuhn not to worry—money is the only important thing in life. 
At the train station, the Baron walks up to the car containing Goll. 
Goll asks the Baron why the Baron came, and the Baron replies fatherly that 
“I just wanted to say good-bye, and be the first to congratulate you.”  Goll is 
stunned, and turns to see a smiling Lilly behind him. We watch them kiss as 
the train pulls away.  
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The movie ends with Hubermayer returning to his factory—now his 
again—while the townspeople cheer. He tells them to get back to work 
making the linen they have produced for 150 years—linen from Bohemia. 
Let us examine the anti-Semitic messaging in this movie. Again we 
see Jews depicted as different, disgusting, and dangerous—but with a different 
emphasis: the danger is more pronounced in this second movie than in the 
first. It begins with numerous scenes pushing the message that Jews are 
different, and continues by showing how the difference is for the worse—
indeed, for the disgusting.  
First, the Jewish characters Kuhn and Pollack have a very different 
conception of business from the non-Jewish businessmen Hubermayer, 
Kettner, and even the other Libussa board members. They are portrayed as 
predatory in business, indifferent to the fact that their machinations inflict 
suffering on the small artisans, as seen in Kuhn’s remark that  “[t]here is more 
at stake . . . than the fate of a few weavers.” By contrast, the non-Jewish 
businessmen have a more cooperative approach to business. They also worry 
deeply about the workers and small businesses, and want to shield them with 
protectionist tariffs. 
Second, the Jewish characters are “cosmopolitan.” This standard 
anti-Semitic accusation is seen in Kuhn’s comment to Pollack that he has 
forgotten his home town and in Pollock’s observation that Kuhn is now a “big 
shot” who has come a long way from his ghetto roots. Kuhn longs to move in 
the biggest international financial circles: “Berlin, Paris, London, New 
York—That’s my world!” By contrast, the “Aryan” businessmen have a sense 
of homeland. Hubermayer is proud of his company’s roots in Bohemia, going 
back 150 years, and his ties with its humble, decent linen-makers. Indeed, 
Kettner explicitly attacks Kuhn for his total lack of patriotism when he says, 
“Maybe our Fatherland is too small for your urges.” 
Third, the Jewish businessmen are portrayed as completely devious, 
whereas the non-Jewish ones are ethical. Kuhn deceives his superior Kettner 
about what he is doing, deceives the other board members about the impact of 
the Libussa scheme on the small tradesmen, and misleads Lilly about the 
nature of his scheme. Pollack cheerfully spies on the young lovers, funnels 
insider information about people in the ministry (especially Goll) to Kuhn, 
and colludes to place a manipulative story in the newspaper about the Libussa 
affair, all for monetary rewards from his nephew. Kuhn deliberately refuses to 
buy linen from the domestic producers so that he can buy majority stakes in 
them and eventually close them all down, even at the cost of hundreds of 
thousands of people starving. By contrast, the “Aryans” show nothing but 
honesty in their business dealings. Goll refuses to compromise his principles, 
even in the face of termination. Kettner withdraws the Libussa petition and 
fires Kuhn the minute he discovers what he is up to. Hubermayer is steadfast 
in his mission to keep the integrity of his company intact and to protect the 
jobs and incomes of the weavers. 
Fourth, the Jews are portrayed once again as physically repellent. 
Kuhn and Pollack are overweight with stereotypical hooked noses. Pollack is 
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bearded, and (the Hitlerian gibe again) not accustomed to bathing frequently. 
In contrast, the young “Aryan” lovers Goll and Lilly are both physically fit 
and handsome, as is Kettner. 
Fifth, both of the Jewish characters, but especially Kuhn, are shown 
to be lacking in romantic love. Kuhn tries to use Lilly as essentially sexual 
bait to sway Goll in favor of the Libussa scheme. Even though Kuhn wants to 
marry her, it is because she is to be a trophy or prize for his scheming work. In 
contrast, the “Aryan” lovers are truly in love. Lilly tries briefly to influence 
her sweetheart, but only after resisting Kuhn’s attempts to push her and finally 
succumbing to her father’s wishes (while he was being manipulated by Kuhn). 
The friendly Baron—a romantic at heart—works hard to see that the lovers 
finally reconcile. 
Finally, the Jews are portrayed as having different and disgusting 
values. Specifically, Kuhn has only two things he values: money and power. 
In his view, power comes from the money he has gotten by manipulating 
others. Pollack, portrayed as less menacing, values only money. In contrast, 
Hubermayer and Kettner value the welfare of the artisans, the economic health 
of the Fatherland, the traditional methods of making products, and the quality 
of the products. 
In the leitmotifs of difference and disgust, Linen from Ireland is 
similar to Robert and Bertram, but Linen from Ireland puts vastly more 
emphasis on the leitmotif of danger. Kuhn—the stereotypical Jew—is clearly 
a menacing man. He frankly craves power, having achieved money already. 
He wants the Gentile girl as a kind of prize, for which he is willing to have a 
marriage take place in a church. This eagerness to hide his “true” identity 
extends to his attire, clean-shaven appearance, and refined manners. The one 
time Kuhn appears angry is when Pollack reminds Kuhn of his origins, that is, 
his “true” identity. 
Furthermore, Kuhn’s ability to manipulate and deceive even such a 
decent man as Kettner shows the danger he poses. His craftiness in planning 
the internationalization of the linen industry shows the threat of giving power 
to such a dissembler. His utter indifference to the possible deaths of hundreds 
of thousands artisans and their families shows that he is a ruthless 
cosmopolitan who is disconnected from the community. Then there is Kuhn’s 
power, with the help of Pollack, to use their connections in the media. This 
shows the threat posed by Jewish control of the media (a constant theme in 
anti-Semitic propaganda to this day). 
Also salient is Kuhn’s lust for the Gentile girl who continuously 
rebuffs his advances. He plans on getting her by forcing her father, through 
deceit and manipulation, to turn his “Aryan” girl over to Kuhn. The movie in 
this way portrays the threat of “racial pollution” which the 1935 Nuremberg 
Laws sought to forbid. 
This leitmotif of danger is so strong that it is in fact jarring in what is 
supposed to be a comedy. Comedies typically portray their villains as 
harmless or even sympathetic: silly, bungling, or perhaps good-hearted after 
all (as are the two rogues in Robert and Bertram). But Kuhn is not funny, 
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silly, harmless, or bungling in any way, and he is surely not good-hearted. He 
is portrayed as a serious, evil, merciless, manipulative, single-minded 
narcissist. Not many laughs there. 
Garden considers this a stronger piece of anti-Semitic propaganda 
than Robert and Bertram, because the dialogue is much more pointedly 
antagonistic toward Jews. While I agree on that last point, I still consider the 
first movie at least as effective, for several reasons. First, Linen from Ireland 
moves slowly and as a comedy seems rather heavy, for the reasons given 
above. The first movie actually had higher gross revenues than did the 
second.
40
 More importantly, the music in the first movie more effectively 
masks the intention of the movie. Goebbels himself held that the most 
effective propaganda is that which appears as pure entertainment. 
Let us take up the topic of how certain psychological mechanisms 
(explained above in Section 3) are exploited in these films. Among the most 
common of these mechanisms are contrast, social proof, sympathy, salience, 
and association. 
A powerful mechanism often exploited in marketing is contrast, 
which works in propaganda as well. In both films, the contrast between the 
non-Jewish (or “Aryan”) and the Jewish characters are drawn to maximum 
effect in conveying the message that Jews are different, disgusting, and 
dangerous. In terms of appearance, the young Aryan lovers (Lenchen and 
Michel, Lilly and Goll) are young, physically fit, beautiful, and attractive, 
while the Jewish counterparts (Ippelmeyer and his wife and daughter, Kuhn 
and his uncle) are middle-aged, obese, ugly, and repellant. The Aryan 
characters are wholesome and clean, while the Jewish ones are unhygenic.  
In manners and mores, again the contrast is stark—nay, Manichean. 
The Aryans are honest and work productively at their legitimate trades, while 
the Jews are deeply dishonest and work as economic parasites. The Aryans are 
transparent and supportive of others, while the Jews are manipulative and sly. 
The Aryans simply want to earn decent livings, while the Jews want excessive 
wealth and economic power. The linen-makers have a sense of homeland, 
while Kuhn repeatedly shows by contrast that he is “cosmopolitan.” 
The mechanism of social proof is frequently used in propaganda. In 
these movies, the townspeople serve as the cuing audience. In Robert and 
Bertrand, we see the townspeople applaud as the vagabonds sing and dance. 
In Linen from Ireland, we see the humble townsfolk at the beginning eager to 
support the honest Hubermayer. 
The mechanism of sympathy is also commonly exploited in both 
marketing and propaganda. In Robert and Bertrand, we feel sympathy for the 
honest businessman Lieps, who is pressured to give up his tavern or force his 
daughter to marry the manipulative money-lender. In Linen from Ireland, we 
feel sympathy for the honest tradesmen and their families whose livelihoods 
the evil Kuhn wishes to destroy. We also feel sympathy for the two Aryan 
                                                          
40 Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945, p. 269. 
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maidens (Lenchen and Lilly), who are the targets of the libidinous designs of 
Jewish malefactors (Biedermeier and Kuhn, respectively). 
Salience is another commonly exploited mechanism in marketing and 
propaganda. In the films under review, the main Jewish characters are shown 
as strikingly different. The Ipelmeyer family, with its garish looks, gaudy 
clothes, luxurious home, and coarse behavior and speech, strike the viewer as 
grotesque. The scenes of Kuhn and his uncle at his hotel room are also 
striking in showing Kuhn to be a dissembler, hiding his “true” background. 
Also salient is Kuhn’s materialistic, rather than romantic, view of love; for 
him, Lilly is a prize in a power-contest. The horrified viewer yet finds it 
difficult to turn away from such displays. 
Association (both positive and negative) is among the most 
commonly used mechanisms in both marketing and propaganda. In seeing 
handsome, honest, and decent “Aryan” characters, the viewer positively 
associates honesty, cleanliness, and decency with non-Jewish ethnic Germans. 
Conversely, he sees ugly, duplicitous, and manipulative Jewish characters, so 
that he negatively associates crookedness, dirtiness, and craftiness with being 
Jewish.  
A “stereotype” is a fixed over-generalized belief or set of beliefs 
about a group of people or things.
41
 When we stereotype groups of people, we 
are engaging in social categorization. This can lead to prejudice and 
discrimination, especially if the underlying stereotype is negative. The films 
under study here most centrally use the mechanisms of contrast, social proof, 
sympathy, and association to arouse and intensify the feelings of difference, 
disgust, and danger. These in turn reinforce and amplify the longstanding 
German cultural stereotypes about Christian Germans and Jewish Germans. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 I have suggested here that the Nazi propaganda machine, arguably 
the most powerful in history, devoted considerable effort to arousing profound 
antipathy toward Jews, specifically intended to sell the German public on the 
Party’s anti-Jewish campaign. While this campaign started out as one of 
ridding Germany and its incorporated lands of its Jewish population by 
harassing Jews to emigrate (and taking their property when they left), it 
mutated to become an absolute war against Jews. The aim became genocide. 
 After Kristallnacht in 1938, the German film industry produced a 
number of anti-Semitic propaganda films. Robert and Bertram and Linen from 
Ireland are two such films that effectively conveyed antipathetic feelings 
toward Jews, especially feelings of difference, disgust, and danger.
42
  Both 
                                                          
41 Saul McCloud, “Stereotypes,” Simple Psychology (2015), accessed online at: 
http://www.simplypsychology.org/katz-braly.html.   
 
42 Since these films are both comedies, the leitmotif of danger was not as pronounced 
as it was in later films, as we shall see in my subsequent article in this series. 
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films were released in 1939, a pivotal year in the malevolent reign of the Nazi 
Regime. It was mid-way between the year the regime achieved control (1933) 
and the year it was vanquished (1945). More importantly, it was the year that 
the Nazi Wehrmacht invaded Poland, bringing England and France into the 
war. Up until 1939, Hitler’s victories were achieved without war. Having 
undertaken war, Hitler became intent on carrying through with his sociopathic 
threat that “if international finance Jewry inside and outside Europe were to 
succeed in pushing people into another world war, then the result would be, 
not the victory of Judaism, but the destruction of the Jewish race in Europe.”43 
In 1939, Goebbels thus turned the Nazi propaganda machine into high gear 
and directed the major studios to produce even more virulent anti-Semitic 
films.
44
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                              
 
43 Quoted in Richard Taylor, Film Propaganda: Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany, 2nd 
rev. ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), p. 185. 
 
44 I wish to thank my colleague Ryan Nichols for his comments on an early draft of 
this article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
